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During the Korean War, thousands of civilians died in a fight between right- and left-
wing forces in the county of Kangbyoŏn, in North Korea, in an incident that South Koreans 
and North Koreans interpret differently. In this article I examine how South Korea’s 
understanding of this traumatic event has shaped the collective memory and identity of 
people from Kangbyŏn and, in turn, has generated the individual memories and identities of 
those people. By exploring how shifting narratives of the post–Cold War era (the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s) have influenced both collective and individual memories and identities, 
I analyze how Cold War–era memories of the Korean War produced “division subjects” with 
identities based on the “us versus them” mentality, and how these people have negotiated 
their memories and identities during the period in which a hegemonic political order based 
on anticommunism faltered.
Keywords: Korean War, politics of memory, trauma, collective memory, personal 
memory, identity, Kangbyŏn Incident
I. IntroductIon
The year 2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, 
the conflict that followed Korea’s liberation from Japan and its subsequent 
division into two nation-states. A watershed in Korean history that helped 
construct the Korean identity, this war caused various traumas to the 
Korean people (such as death, injuries, separation, and forced relocation), 
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particularly because the front lines constantly shifted, thus turning almost 
the entire peninsula into a battlefield. The country was leveled to the ground; 
an estimated 1,300,000 South Koreans and 2,500,000 north Koreans were 
reported killed, wounded, or missing; and countless people were threatened 
with death (Kim 2000). As a result, the war became a foundational experience 
for many of the Korean people who lived through it.
As the political division persisted through the cold War era, the South 
Korean and north Korean regimes each claimed to represent the legitimate 
Korean nation, and both prolonged the conflict by “remembering the war.” 
Both regimes mobilized various rituals, erected monuments, and organized 
war-related anniversaries in attempts to appropriate the experience of war as 
sacred sacrifice. At the same time, they constantly evoked the tragedy of the 
war and thus kept their citizens in check with reminders that they were in a 
state of emergency during which the enemy could invade again and destroy 
everything (Kim 1999; Kim 2000; Lee 2006).1 In this way, memories of the 
tragic war lent some legitimacy to authoritarian regimes and justified their 
suppression of dissent and opposition. Both regimes had been vulnerable 
upon their establishment but successfully consolidated their hold on power 
by using memories of the war to overcome internal division and conflicts. 
However, the memories themselves differed dramatically, depending on the 
ideology of each regime.
north Korea remembers the war as an event in which “South Korean 
lackeys at the order of the u.S. imperial power mobilized the puppet South 
Korean army and invaded the north” (research Institute of History at the 
Academy of Social Sciences 1988, 394). under the banner of “anti-imperialist, 
anticolonial struggle,” a north Korean people arose from this memory. In 
contrast, South Korea remembers the war as a tragedy of fratricidal war that 
resulted from the communist army’s sudden invasion of the South. this 
memory contributed to the establishment of an “anticommunist regimented 
society” in which anticommunism governs social relations and behaviors 
(cho 2000; Lee 2006; 2010). In both Koreas, other memories have been 
suppressed, and people who supported these official memories have long 
1 There is an element of truth to these claims: the war never formally ended. Thus South 
Korea and north Korea are actually in a state of ceasefire, not peace.
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enjoyed legitimacy. As a result, a version of “the homogenization of memory” 
of the Korean War has been created in each Korea and become a “collective 
memory.”
In the 1990s, South Koreans experienced a period of dramatic social 
and political transformation in which a hegemonic political order based on 
anticommunism faltered. The period saw critical changes on both the local 
and global levels, including South Korea’s transition from military to civilian 
rule and the worldwide ebb of the cold War. during that time it also became 
apparent that South Korea had won the race for economic supremacy against 
north Korea.
In the wake of South Korea’s “victory,” a new perspective has evolved in 
South Korea that urges the regime to reconcile and cooperate with north 
Korea—seeing the north as a partner, (rather than an enemy), so the two 
countries can work together to strengthen the Koreas’ collective “national” 
(i.e., an encompassing Korean ethnic community) capacities in the era of 
globalization. this perspective has prompted reevaluations of numerous 
incidents that had been labeled as “atrocities of the reds” based on the “us 
versus them” mentality of authoritarian regimes. Even though considerable 
number of these incidents were civilian massacres perpetrated by the u.S. 
or South Korean armies or by the South Korean civilian militias during the 
establishment of the anticommunist state or during the Korean War, under 
those regimes they had little possibility of representation by the South as 
anything but “atrocities of the reds.” Thanks to the testimonies of previously 
silenced survivors, however, they have now entered the realm of “contested 
memory.” In this way, dominant South Korean discourses of the war based 
on the memories of both the “atrocities of the communists” and the “victory 
of liberal democracy” have been ruptured and pluralized. Scholars have 
pointed to the need for reflection on the processes of memory formation 
and their material effects through the critical examination of the material 
and ideological basis by which official memory becomes the “truth” while 
suppressing other memories.2 these discussions have called for studies of 
2 representative works include Kim (2002); Kim (2006); Kim (1999; 2001); Kwon (2006); 
Pak (2000; 2010); Pyo (2003); The Institute for Korean Historical Studies (1999); The 
national committee for Investigating the truth about civilian Massacre during the 
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the “politics of memory,” focusing on “social and political characteristics of 
memory” and “their relationships with identity formation.”3 
This article builds on studies of critical reflection in the politics of memory 
in South Korea yet differs from them in several key ways. Most studies have 
concentrated on events and memories that have been distorted and forgotten 
in the process of establishing South Korea as an anticommunist society, but 
this one explores the memory of people who were revered as anticommunist 
fighters in South Korea because they had initiated an anticommunist uprising 
in the north during the war. their identity arose from their collective 
memory of the war as an anticommunist crusade. This article calls attention 
to the characteristics of this collective memory and the mechanism through 
which it was constructed, and at the same time analyzes relationships between 
collective memory and personal memory.
I also examine how people who based their identity on their memories 
as anticommunist fighters have negotiated it in the post–cold War era of 
“national reconciliation and cooperation.” When people form their identities 
based on the dominant memory, what do they experience when the dominant 
memory becomes an object of competition and rupture? By addressing these 
issues, this article complements studies of the process and mechanism of 
the return of silenced memory and thereby provides ethnographic data that 
enriches the literature on the politics of memory during and after the cold 
War.
this analysis focuses on an incident that took place in 1950, during the 
Korean War, when thousands (the exact number is contested) of civilians 
perished in the county of Kangbyŏn, in north Korea.4 north Korea and 
South Korea have completely different memories and interpretations of the 
event, which is a prime example of the politics of memory in the cold War–
era. using data obtained through participant observation and interviews, this 
Korean War (2005); Yi (2001); Yoon (1997); and Yu (2007).
3 For the “politics of memory,” see chong and Yi (2009); Hirsh (2009); Kim (1998); 
Kwon (2006). 
4 I have changed all names and dates to protect the interviewees’ privacy. Some scholars 
question the need (or desirability) of altering names and dates in an analysis of a 
historical event. Because my aim here is not determine a “historical truth,” I have 
chosen to prioritize the interviewees’ privacy. 
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article examines how this event affected the members of the Kangbyŏnhoe 
(an organization of Kangbyŏn residents who survived the conflict and fled 
to the South) and investigates four themes: 1) how the Kangbyŏnhoe people 
remember the incident, 2) the factors that influenced their memories, 3) the 
relationships between memory and identity on both collective and personal 
levels, and 4) how the end of the cold War has reshaped these memories and 
identities. In this way, it analyzes the subjects that memories of the Korean 
War in the era of cold War have produced and how they negotiate their 
memories and identities in the era of faltering cold War grammar.
II. tHE PoLItIcS oF MEMorY, IdEntItY, And trAuMA
the politics of memory “encompasses dynamics of social, cultural, and 
political power that intervenes in the process of historicization or deletion 
of collective memory and a mechanism of related discursive practice” (Kim 
1998, 191). According to this definition, both the act and the contents of 
memory are constructed in relation to sociocultural contexts in which 
memory occurs; they do not necessarily reflect empirical reality. this 
position holds that memory is not a subjective or individual phenomenon: 
individual memory is always linked to group memory. Memory is shared 
(and therefore social) and enters the public realm at the moment of utterance, 
because testimonies are always given to and received by others. In other 
words, individual memories are constructed in relation to others. Memory 
also accompanies oblivion, because memories that are not desirable in a 
community (or accepted by others) are often silenced and thus forgotten. In 
this sense, we are not the sole owners of our memory, because it encompasses 
others. Accordingly, Halbwachs (1980) concludes that purely individual 
memory does not exist; rather, collective memory serves as a framework to 
constitute and structure individual memories. At the same time, collective 
memory exists only when individual memories interact.
remembering does not entail the collection of objective information; 
rather, it is an act of giving significance and interpretation to certain 
experiences. An essential process of identity formation, remembering functions 
as a social rule that frames how individuals select significant experiences from 
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fragmented and complicated ones. In this way, both individual memory and 
identity are constructed in relation to others (Han 2002, 68-69).
remembering similarly shapes collective memory and identity, and in this 
process shared memory is an essential element in the formation of collective 
identity. When a group bases its identity on one particular memory and not 
others, a complicated social process intervenes, often connected to power 
relations. A group’s sociopolitical location in a society and its relation to other 
groups are critical in the construction of group memory, and thus memory 
changes dynamically with changes to these positions. realms of remembrance 
are relegated to the realms of oblivion, and the realms of oblivion are revived 
as realms of remembrance, depending on the sociopolitical circumstances. 
Memory and identity interact: memory constructs identity, but identity also 
constructs memory.
In this article I analyze the dynamic relationship between memory and 
identity. I examine the collective memory of the Kangbyŏnhoe people by 
emphasizing its mechanisms and characteristics. At the same time, I consider 
the relationship between collective memory and personal memory and 
their relationship to identity, and discuss challenges to these memories and 
identities.
this article examines memories of the Kangbyŏnhoe people in relation 
to discussions of trauma. They lived through Japanese colonialism, national 
division, the north Korean communist regime, the Korean War, and the 
dictatorships and the democratization of South Korea. thus, their stories 
are full of suffering and struggle, and many Kangbyŏnhoe people told me 
that their stories could fill hundreds of books. the Korean War figures 
prominently in their narratives about losing loved ones, dislocation, 
deprivation, and their fights against “the reds.”
Although the war had devastating effects, the “division politics” of the 
South Korean postwar regimes’ efforts to construct an anticommunist nation-
state contributed tremendously to these people’s enduring sense of insecurity 
and anxiety.5 In examining Kangbyŏnhoe peoples’ subjectivities in relation to 
5 I use “division politics” to refer to South Korea’s competition with (and rejection 
of the legitimacy of) north Korea, based on the ideology of anticommunism. My 
understanding of “politics” here is not limited to the formal domain of politics 
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trauma, I draw inspiration from scholars of the political and cultural nature of 
trauma in order to wrest this subject from conventional approaches that focus 
on its symptomatological and psychological aspects (Edkins 2003; Hakken 
2002; Humprey 2000; radstone 2002; Wise 2004). The conventional approach, 
what radstone (2002) calls “trauma theory” (457), studies the impact of 
catastrophic events on human psychological and physical functioning. Many 
scholars have pointed out that this approach is limited because it overlooks 
the ways in which traumatic events undergo the “processes of narrativization 
and memory making” (457), which are embedded in the relations of power. 
As Edkins (2003) cogently argues, the ways in which we acknowledge, 
describe, and remember what we call “traumatic experiences” are always 
influenced by hegemonic discourses, and the production of trauma often 
entails the workings of a sovereign power. In other words, trauma “cannot 
be separated from the sociocultural process as far as it is represented” (Kim 
2009, 36), and the politics of memory is at work in the process. 
III.  KAngBYŎnHoE And “tHE 9.30 AntIcoMMunISt 
uPrISIng”6
In April 1998, in the midst of my dissertation fieldwork on Korean national 
division and the formation of division subjects, a Silhyangmin (a person 
who has lost his or her homeland) whom I had met in the early stage of my 
research told me of a place where I “could meet many Silhyangmin on a daily 
basis and hear their life stories.”7 People from Kangbyŏn had established a 
often discussed as divorced from the economic and cultural aspects of a society. 
The definition I employ enables me to consider not only the formal aspects of South 
Korean politics, but also its social and cultural aspects. this perspective invites 
analysis of the articulation of different ideologies and the construction of specific 
political subjects through different cultural technologies. For more discussions on 
division politics, see Lee (2006).
6 Koreans tend to refer to significant events by the date on which they occurred, saying 
each numeral separately. Thus this event’s name is read as “nine three zero.”
7 Silhyangmin are the people who came into what is now South Korea from what is now 
north Korea between Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945 and the end of the Korean 
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civil organization (called Kangbyŏnhoe) that gathered in a small space called 
“the office.”8 Because many Silhyangmin came to the office to meet their 
friends, he thought that it would be a good research site for me. Located on 
the rooftop of a shopping center in downtown Seoul, the office resembled a 
community center for the elderly. Members talked in a small room furnished 
with a table, a sofa, and a table and used a larger room (with two big tables 
and many chairs) for watching television or playing hwat’u (a card game) 
or changgi (a Korean version of chess). during the day, 10 to 15 men (most 
of whom were retired) in their 60s and older came to the office to see their 
friends. I visited the office once or twice a week to conduct participant 
observation and interviews.
From my first visit to the office, I could see that members of the 
Kangbyŏnhoe were frustrated with South Korea’s political situation and inter-
Korean relations.9 Mr. Song, an active member of the Kangbyŏnhoe, railed 
against the news about chong chu-yong’s plan to visit north Korea:10
now we can’t talk about our fights with the reds or anticommunism. Kim dae 
Jung and Kim Yong Sam are the heads of that bunch who were doing ŭisha 
ŭisha [onomatopoeiatic expression for demonstrating]. chong chu-yong is 
War in 1953. the term “Silhyangmin” describes both this group and an individual 
member of this group.
8 It is not common for small Silhyangmin organizations to have such a space. 
9 The year 1998 was when then-president Kim dae Jung, who had long been accused of 
being a communist sympathizer, sought national reconciliation and cooperation with 
north Korea.
10 chong, the founder of Hyundai group, took 500 head of cattle to the north in June 
1998. When he ran away from his home in north Korea in 1932, he had taken the 
money his father had gained by selling the family cow before the Korean War. Thus, 
his 1998 return was depicted as a “a personal triumph for him whose lifetime wish 
has been to become successful and pay back his father a thousand times for a youthful 
misdeed” (Korea Herald, 18 June, 1998). However, it was as much the product of 
political change as a “personal triumph,” since his visit was made possible by the new 
government’s principle of separation of politics and business in dealing with north 
Korea. there was a mix of envy and criticism of chong’s visit among Silhyangmin 
that I interviewed. His visit also brought about mixed reactions from the progressive 
forces: whereas some praised him as a figure in overcoming the division, others 
viewed his action as motivated by his desire to advance his capitalist interests-by 
facilitating Hyundai group investments in north Korea. 
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taking cows to the north? crazy! They are our enemies. He wants them to eat 
well and be strong.
during my fieldwork I had often heard the Silhyangmin hardline position 
toward north Korea and criticism of the South Korean government’s “sunshine 
policy,” but Mr. Song’s expressions were much more vehement. When I asked 
him to tell me his life stories so I could understand his perspective, he was 
very concise:
Even if you listen to 100 people from our hometown, their stories are the 
same. All the same. We lived in the north. When 6.25 [the Korean War] 
occurred, we fought against communists. After coming South, we still fought 
as guerillas. Then we tried to make a living and succeeded.
His collective representation of the people of the Kangbyŏnhoe intrigued me. 
over time, I discovered that this kind of collective representation was very 
common among the members of the Kangbyŏnhoe, and the memory of the 
“Kangbyŏn 9.30 Anticommunist uprising” was central to their narratives. 
It functioned as a “critical event” that “institute[d] a new modality of 
historical action” for a group of people (das 1995, 6). the “Kangbyŏn 9.30 
Anticommunist uprising” is one of many controversial historical incidents of 
the Korean War in which thousands of civilian lives were lost. The experience 
and memory of this event organized the collective and personal identity of 
the Kangbyŏnhoe people and continued to structure their political views and 
actions. 
These narratives of Kangbyŏnhoe people stressed the nature of the event 
as “a voluntary anticommunist uprising against the reds” rather than as 
a tragedy that caused massive civilian casualties. Proud to describe the 
incident as the largest anticommunist uprising in the north, members of the 
Kangbyŏnhoe saw it as proof of the north Korean communist regime’s failure. 
Although these people admitted that “the whole county stank of blood” 
and that “thousands of people must have died,” they saw the victims as “the 
reds who harassed patriots and innocent people” or “families of the reds.” 
(the few exceptions were “hundreds of our side,” when north Korea ruled 
Kangbyŏn.) These reds or their families were “subhuman beings” to whom 
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moral standards did not apply.11 These descriptions reiterated the dominant 
discourses of South Korea and thus contributed to the formation of South 
Korea’s official narratives.
IV.  “AntIcoMMunISt uPrISIng” VErSuS “u.S. ArMY 
MASSAcrE”: tWo nAMES And tWo coMPEtIng trutHS
The Kangbyŏn Incident has multiple names. The South Korean government 
calls it Kangbyŏn 9.30 Pan’gong Ŭigŏ (the Kangbyŏn 9.30 Anticommunist 
uprising), sometimes shortened to 9.30 uigeo (9.30 uprising) or Kangbyŏn 
Pan’gong Ŭigeŏ (Kangbyŏn Anticommunist uprising). In north Korea, it is 
known as Kangbyŏn taejunghaksal Manhaeng (The Atrocity of the Kangbyŏn 
Mass Massacre). As “mnemonic signs” that “condense an interpretation 
of events and give the day a historical saliency . . . [that] is selective and 
highlights some aspects and obscures others” (Alonso 1988, 39), these names 
“define reality, create history, and shape memory” (Arexaga, 1997, 43). In a 
narrow sense, these different names signify competing characterizations of 
the incident; in the broad sense they represent north and South Korean views 
of the character of the Korean War, a source of foundational narratives for 
each state’s nation building.
north Korean historians claim that the u.S. army and its Korean puppets 
in the south killed 35,383 innocent civilians (one-fourth of the county’s 
population), including women and children, when u.S. forces occupied the 
county between october 17 and december 7, 1950. north Korea made the 
attack an international political issue. In a 1951 letter to the u.n., Park Heon-
yong, north Korea’s secretary of foreign affairs, cited this incident as typical of 
massacres committed during the u.n. occupation north of the 38th parallel. 
After north Korea politicized this incident, a few progressive international 
organizations sent research groups to north Korea on two occasions. These 
research groups, according to testimonies of the Kangbyŏn residents, 
accepted north Korea’s assertion that the u.S. army had massacred tens of 
11 on the issues of formation of anticommunist state of South Korea and its relation to 
the production of racist discourses/images of the reds, see Kim (2001) and Lee (2006).
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thousands of civilians. However, the u.S. and South Korean governments 
and the u.n. denied this allegation. Since then, north Korea has insisted to 
the international community and its citizens that the u.S. army slaughtered 
civilians during the war. As a part of this effort, north Korea transformed a 
government office building for the national People’s congress of Kangbyŏn 
into a Memorial Museum of the Kangbyŏn Massacre and called on survivors 
and witnesses to testify about “the brutality of the u.S. army” and “the great 
struggle of the people against it.”
the book Let’s Not Forget the Grudge of Kangbyŏn,12 published in the 
north in 1987, recounts the north Korean version of this event. This book is 
full of pictures of victims, details of massacres, letters by victims’ families, and 
witness testimonies. It names the u.S. commander who supposedly directed 
the massacre and lists the incident among many other historical crimes of the 
“u.S. imperial power” since the “discovery of the American continent.” It also 
reveals the brutality of the “u.S. imperial power” by emphasizing the murders 
of women and children. At the same time, by highlighting the people’s heroic 
and patriotic resistance against the u.S. army, it supports north Korea’s 
interpretation of the Korean War as “a struggle against u.S. imperialism and 
its South Korean puppet regime,” thus promoting national unity based on the 
spirit of revenge.
In contrast, the official South Korean narrative, Kangbyŏn Kunji (The 
Documentation of Kangbyŏn County), describes the incident as a voluntary 
anticommunist uprising organized by nationalist elites and youth who 
had been oppressed by the communist regime. It opens with the following 
description:
north Korean youth-students had been happy with a dream for real 
independence and liberty [at the moment of Korea’s liberation from Japan.] 
However, as a pack of wolves came in and harassed people with communism, 
12 this book’s title includes the county’s actual name. therefore I have used the 
pseudonym “Kangbyŏn” here (and not listed this work as a reference, because its 
publication information will make it readily identifiable) in order to protect my 
informants’ privacy. I have done the same for two other works I mention in this 
text: Kangbyŏn Kunji (The Documentation of Kangbyŏn County) and Warriors of 
Anticommunism.
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north Korea turned into a living hell. Thus many of them came over to the 
South and exerted their best efforts to establish the republic of Korea (1984, 
146).
this narrative also argues that youth-students who had remained in town 
also fought bravely against the communists. In the process, many of them 
were almost conscripted by the “puppet group” (north Korean communists 
who had decided to invade the South) but fled to the mountains to escape the 
draft. together with those who could not escape and thus remained in town, 
these escapees “formed a secret anticommunist guerrilla group” and “solemnly 
vowed, motivated by revenge, to work together to accomplish the great 
work of unification” after “witnessing the rebels’ brutal slaughter of innocent 
patriots when they retreated to the north.” The document also describes the 
indiscriminate killings of civilians by north Korean communists and states 
that “the uprising force, composed of anticommunist patriots and patriotic 
youth-students, defeated this puppet army.” It also highlights the extensive 
cooperation by county residents with leaders of the “uprising,” signifying 
the failure of the communist rule. It does not specify the total death toll, but 
reveals that 225 lives were lost on the southern side (146-156).
Another book, Warriors of Anticommunism, claims to be a record 
of this incident. Published in the South in 1957 it was written from an 
anticommunist perspective and based on the testimonies of surviving 
participants. With a goal of “countering north Korea’s propaganda,” the 
author focuses on “smashing north Korea’s slander” with more than 500 
pages of testimony from witnesses and participants. troubled by north 
Korea’s propaganda war, the South Korean government gave the book 
credibility by providing the author with the vice president’s signature and 
testimonials by the Minister of defense and the Public Prosecutor general. 
Warriors of Anticommunism traces the origin of the “9.30 Anticommunist 
uprising” to the oppression and massacre of the people by north Korean 
communists. It mentions a few killings by the right wing, but reports them as 
inevitable reprisals against “the reds.”
In a narrow sense, the terms “uprising” and “massacre” represent 
competition over signifying practices of this incident. More broadly, however, 
they are different significations of the Korean War by the two Korean states. 
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The war is a fundamental event in the formation of both Korean states.
north Korea calls the war a “Fatherland Liberation War” and defines it 
as an incident initiated by “South Korean lackeys at the order of the u.S. 
imperial power” (research Institute of History at the Academy of Social 
Sciences, 394). For the north, the war was part of the uSA’s goal “to militarily 
occupy South Korea and make it its complete colony” (290) and “to expand 
its reactionary ruling system to the north of the republic and make our 
fatherland a complete colony of the u.S. imperialists by means of a fratricidal 
war” (394). north Korean historians also argue that “wherever the u.S. 
imperialist-invaders who initiated this immoral war and their mercenaries 
[i.e., the South Korean army] arrive with their red [bloody] hands and feet, 
the noble blood of members of the Labor Party and peaceful civilians runs 
down without exception. they soaked our beautiful fatherland in the red 
blood of the people” (417). At the same time, the north Korean view insists 
that the popular struggle against oppression was formidable. Chosŏn T’ongsa 
describes it as follows:
u.S. imperialists’ unprecedented brutality could not coerce north Korean 
people into submission. All people, from patriotism, stood up and fought 
against the enemy in occupied territories. the communist Party and 
communists led the vanguard in these fights (418).
north Korea’s representation of the Korean War frames this incident, as seen 
in the fact that this perspective constantly argues that the u.S. army is the 
event’s main actor.
South Korea’s version of this incident is also closely related to its 
interpretation of the Korean War. As an extension of its representation of the 
war both as an invasion of the immoral and illegal north Korean communists 
and as a victory of civilians and the South Korean army who fought with the 
u.n. troops, it characterizes the Kangbyŏn Incident as a voluntary uprising 
of an oppressed people. civilian deaths were unavoidable because they 
were caused either by communists or while resisting the communists. In 
this interpretation, people who fought for democracy did not have to take 
responsibility for the deaths.
In this way, two different versions of truth, or memory, exist about the 
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Kangbyŏn Incident. Particularly interesting is the fact that South Korea’s 
memory is a rebuttal of north Korea’s version of this incident. Kangbyŏn 
Kunji states that north Korea “exaggerates the number of victims and forced 
young students to see the exhibition center that is full of fabricated false 
propaganda” (155). The introduction to Warriors of Anticommunism refutes 
north Korea’s version of memory by accusing it of distorting the truth. 
The use of the date September 30 in South Korean versions of this incident 
implies that the uprising preceded the u.S. army’s entrance into the town on 
october 17. The name itself serves as evidence against north Korea’s account 
and proves that South Korea’s memory of the incident is constructed in 
interactions with north Korea’s memory.
Members of the Kangbyŏnhoe have actively participated in the creation 
and spread of this South Korean version of the incident. the author of 
Warriors of Anticommunism is a member of the Kangbyŏnhoe, and many 
members of that group whom I met during my fieldwork described 
the incident in ways that replicated the official discourse. Because their 
experiences were so painful, these witnesses were reluctant to offer detailed 
descriptions of the event. rather, their narratives had more to do with north 
Korea’s interpretation of it. When they talked to me, they mentioned a north 
Korean book about the incident and offered line-by-line challenges to that 
version. they contended that civilians like themselves, not the u.S. army, 
had initiated the incident. They argued that the death toll was much smaller 
than the one given by north Koreans and blamed the casualty rate on the fact 
that “there were so many people who resented vicious communists.” In other 
words, these members of the Kangbyŏnhoe conceptualized the incident as 
the “people’s uprising against the north Korean communists’ tyranny” and 
posited themselves as heroes of popular resistance.
their persistent refutation was also an expression of anxiety. Based on 
their readings of north Korean publications and propaganda, they believed 
that north Korea defined them as “puppets of the u.S. imperialists” and 
“deadly enemies” and thus as targets of revenge. they also believed that 
Kim dae Jung’s reconciliatory policy toward north Korea and the South 
Korean government’s reevaluation of history made people likely to accept 
north Korea’s version of this incident. At the same time, the “north Korean 
interpretation and practices” they mentioned are as imaginary to them as 
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they are real. the Kangbyŏnhoe people combined pieces of information 
about north Korea that they collected from news articles and north Korean 
defectors’ testimonies, and mixed them with their own memories of north 
Korea. Then they grasped “north Korean reality”: 
they [north Korean communists] know everything about us. our names 
are written in Kim Jong Il’s notebook as “reactionaries.” . . .  our families 
are all dead. they killed all of them. they could never leave families of 
anticommunist fighters alive.
these stories reflect dominant images of a north Korea “that knows 
everything and is an extremely violent totalitarian state.” These Kangbyŏnhoe 
people believe that remaining in a state of war against north Korea is the only 
way to protect South Korea, and view themselves as “fighting subjects” against 
north Korea and its sympathizers.
V.  tHoSE WHo WEnt Into tHE MountAInS VErSuS 
tHoSE WHo rEMAInEd In toWn: IntErnAL 
conFLIctS oVEr “trutH”
different views about the “truth” of the Kangbyŏn Incident—that is, 
disagreements about how to remember it—lay not only between the two 
Koreas but also among the Kangbyŏnhoe people. In the course of my 
fieldwork, I learned that since the early 1990s the Kangbyŏnhoe people had 
been working to publish another version of the Kangbyŏn Incident. Mr. Hyon, 
the person in charge of the new book, informed me that the Kangbyŏnhoe 
had been preparing this work because they wanted to publish a more accurate 
and objective account than Warriors of Anticommunism. According to him, 
two groups of anticommunist fighters had participated in what he called “the 
Kangbyŏn uprising”: a group of young men who had fled into the mountains 
to avoid conscription, and townspeople. Warriors of Anticommunism, he 
insisted, did not give enough credit for this latter group. Mr. Hyon added, 
“The people who went into the mountains survived the incident better and 
quickly moved south. They gained power by settling down earlier when the 
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South Korean army retreated with the participation of the People’s Army of 
china.” In other words, the mountain group had wealth and power in South 
Korea and wrongly took all of the credit for the Kangbyŏn Incident. He then 
noted that Warriors of Anticommunism mentioned some people who had not 
participated in the incident at all but who were friends with the author, and 
that the author himself had exaggerated his own role in the incident. For all of 
these reasons, Mr. Hyon stated, a more accurate history needed to be written.
According to Mr. Hyon, “the uprising” was initiated and led by 
townspeople. He emphasized that he had interviewed all of the surviving 
participants and that his version of the incident was “a faithful writing of the 
facts.” to ensure objectivity, he claimed, he included the real names of all of 
his interviewees when he quoted their testimonies. However, he was unable 
to publish it until 2000 because, according to Mr. Hyon, none of the survivors 
of the event who read the manuscript liked it. “Everybody wanted to be the 
protagonist of the incident,” he complained. The people who had hidden in 
the mountains did not want the manuscript published at all; nor did one of 
the self-proclaimed leaders of the Kangbyŏnhoe (a man who claimed the 
leadership position because he was wealthy, not because he had actually done 
anything). In short, none of the contributors believed he had received the 
credit he deserved.
this controversy over the record of the incident reveals multiple truths 
among the Kangbyŏnhoe people. Because one way of remembering eclipsed 
the others, disagreements arose. unlike the different “truths” held by the 
two Koreas, however, differing “truths” among the Kangbyŏnhoe people 
are consistent with the official interpretation of the incident as a voluntary 
uprising by people who had been oppressed by the communist regime. But 
controversy persisted over who initiated the incident and who participated in 
it.
Mr. Hyon’s story reflects the significance of this incident and the identity 
formation of an anticommunist fighter as a powerful source of symbolic 
capital within the Kangbyŏnhoe, as well as in South Korea’s anticommunist 
society. If identity is always formed in relation to others and constructed in 
the way others recognize, it also signals the prevalence of empathic listeners 
over a long period of time in South Korea. Their long efforts to develop an 
identity as anticommunist fighters are related to the fact that anticommunism 
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has long been a dominant grammar in South Korean society. division politics 
that remind people of the constant state of emergency under which they live 
and promote personal fulfillment through the extinction of the enemy (based 
on an “us versus them” mentality) has given members of the Kangbyŏnhoe 
spaces of competition in which they can claim for themselves the identity of 
anticommunist fighters. Because the incident caused thousands of civilian 
deaths in a small rural county, I wonder what it would be like to have 
participated in or witnessed such a terrible massacre and yet continue to 
celebrate it. The division and division politics have created a tragic situation 
in which people fight over memories that are likely too painful to remember.
Publication of the new version of the Kangbyŏn Incident was also 
delayed for political reasons. Members of the Kangbyŏnhoe expressed 
their distaste for the Kim dae Jung government, saying, “It is no longer a 
source of pride that we fought for democracy [minjujuŭi] anymore under 
this ‘red’ government.” one member bitterly complained that “people like 
us, anticommunists, are even called ‘anti-unification forces’ in these days.” 
They decided that it was too dangerous to remember the Kangbyŏn uprising 
under Kim dae Jung’s “red government” and thus chose instead to relegate 
those memories to the realm of oblivion. they invested themselves in the 
narratives of the incident based on the collective identity of the people of the 
Kangbyŏnhoe as “fighters for the liberal democracy [chayu minjujuŭi].” Thus, 
as they experienced the time when their career as anticommunist had ceased 
to be a source of pride, they felt extremely insecure. 
they were especially angry about revisionist accounts and the attempts 
of both the Kim Yong Sam and Kim dae Jung governments to reevaluate the 
violent practices of authoritarian regimes. “We thought that they [historical 
incidents revisited] were committed by the reds. We were told so. now 
everything becomes sins of the [previous South Korean] government and 
of the united States. The world is turning upside down, ruled by the reds,” 
they lamented. Part of their anger came from their fear that the Kangbyŏn 
uprising would receive the same revisionist treatment: “What if the reds 
decide that the Kangbyŏn uprising was our fault?”
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VI. coLLEctIVE MEMorY And PErSonAL MEMorY
over time, I learned that not all the members of the Kangbyŏnhoe actively 
participated in the incident, even though they have long portrayed themselves 
as fighters against communism. Accordingly, as the reconciliation between 
the two Koreas began during my fieldwork, they expressed their collective 
political and social location as “outsiders” or “anti-unification forces.” Then 
they insisted that all Sihyangmin were in the same position.
Mr. Song is a typical example of someone who has invested in the 
collective identity of anticommunist fighters even though he did not 
participate in the incident. He gave me a confusing account of his role in the 
event, but another member informed me that Mr. Song had “just remained 
in town and followed us to the South.” Mr. Song’s case shows how personal 
memory that is often understood as being formed and transformed according 
to a memory system is in fact influenced and constructed by a person’s society 
and culture (Kwon 2006, 13).
Mr. Song’s case also illustrates how the South Korean authoritarian 
regimes opened a space for Kangbyŏnhoe people to appropriate this 
traumatic story as part of a heroic anticommunist struggle, and how this 
appropriation has made Mr. Song feel personally invested in the trauma. The 
fact that Mr. Song did not participate in the incident but narrates and lives 
it as a collective participant demonstrates the power of those regimes, which 
used anticommunism to organize narratives and to produce and govern their 
subjects. At the same time, Mr. Song’s story shows how personal memory is 
not completely framed by a society’s dominant memory. Incoherence in Mr. 
Song’s stories can serve as an object of analysis that reveals the ideological 
character of the incident narratives.
Mr. Song admitted that he had once wanted to join the north Korean 
communist Party, but he did so in the context of his critique of it:
those communists were so bad. I really tried to be a member of the party, 
since the majority of the people at my workplace were party members and it 
would help me get promoted quickly.
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Mr. Song had obviously not always been an anticommunist. nevertheless, 
he frames his memory to emphasize the drawbacks of communism. this 
pattern continues throughout his account of his life. For example, he worked 
at the regional branch of the north Korean Monopoly office to administrate 
the trade of monopoly goods such as tobacco, salt, and ginseng, and thus had 
no memory “of being insulted [sumo rŭl tanghada] by the reds.” He heard 
rumors that the communists executed people suspected of anticommunist 
activities, but he himself never suffered in this regard. His family even 
benefited from north Korea’s land reform. He once commented that his 
mother was so happy to get land that she exclaimed, “oh! things that I 
expected have finally come [ol gŏt i watkuna]! the land should be given to 
farmers.” But he claimed that he had always had a secret antipathy for the 
communists. In answer to my question on how he came to resent the party, 
he said that it was “natural for young people to have ill feelings about the 
government.” Later he told me that he stayed in town when the “Kangbyŏn 
Anticommunist uprising” occurred, because he did not have to escape like 
his colleagues, most of whom were party members. I suspected that this 
might have been the moment that decided his fate, but he did not interpret it 
that way. rather, he wanted to assign more agency to himself by ambiguously 
describing himself as one of the “fighters” inspired by the “natural feelings of 
young people,” without specifying his role in the event.
Whenever the issue of separated families was raised, he seemed very 
uncomfortable. criticizing Kim dae Jung’s sunshine policy and promise to 
reunite separated families, Mr. Song said:
My family members in ibuk [north Korea] are all dead. I came south after 
fighting [against the communists]. Would they [the communists] leave them 
alive? There will not be a reunion of separated families. All of Kim dae Jung’s 
words are lies.
Among the Kangbyŏnhoe people there was a widespread rumor that all their 
families in north Korea had been executed or removed to other regions 
by the north Korean regime. Mr. Song told me that they heard this from 
a member of the KcIA (the Korean central Intelligence Agency, renamed 
in 1999 as the national Intelligence Service) and thus believed that none 
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of them would be able to see their families in the north even if there were 
exchanges between the two Koreas. Mr. Song also suspected that his own 
family had been killed by the communists: “they killed all the families of 
fighters for liberal democracy.” In this belief lies his identity as a fighter, 
which originated in the narratives of the members of the Kangbyŏnhoe as the 
fighters for liberal democracy. Because he endorsed the representation of the 
people of the Kangbyŏnhoe as anticommunist fighters, he was bound into 
that collectivity. In order to assert his ideological position, he therefore had to 
assume that his families had been killed.
 Because of his displacement, Mr. Song has made his home far from his 
homeland, where his family died. Maybe this was why he took one of the most 
extreme positions on north Korea. For him, ibuk (north Korea) was filled 
with the enemy. He insisted, “We should let Ibuk die from starvation because 
they are our enemies” and opposed any kind of humanitarian assistance to 
the north. He also believed that communication or negotiation with north 
Korea was impossible, which left only one possible kind of unification: the 
South’s absorption of the north. Any attempt to challenge that theory was 
threatening to him.
In July 1999 I met Mr. Song at the unification Building when he came 
to participate in an event organized by the provincial civil organizations.13 
He had not wanted to participate in the event because he disliked the guest 
speaker (the Minister of unification), but he was required to attend in order 
to meet his county’s quota of participants.14 Shilhyangmin organizations 
had long mobilized their members for government events, and finding 
willing attendees was not much problem when the political positions of the 
13 the unification Building is a government-owned building that contains both 
the offices of government agencies (Ibukodowiwŏnhoe [the committee for 
Five Provinces in the northern Part of Korea]) and the Silhyangmins’ main civil 
organizations (Ibukodowiwŏnhoe [The Association of citizens for the Five Provinces 
of the northern Part of Korea]). Ibukodowiwŏnhoe is a symbolic administrative 
organization to govern “a yet unreclaimed area that is temporarily occupied by an 
antistate organization” (i.e., north Korea). It is based on the territorial clause of South 
Korean Basic Law, which defines the territory of north Korea as its own.
14 “nobody wanted to come,” he complained, so as a county manager he had to 
participate.
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government and of Silhyangmin organizations coincided.
Mr. Song told me that under previous regimes this type of event had been 
one “through which we could hear news about north Korea’s situation and we 
could help government’s policies.” However, as the new government in 1999 
had a different (i.e., oppositional) political position with the Silhyangmin 
organizations, there existed ground for conflicts. Because the representative 
Silhyangmin organization, Ibukodominhoe, was not free from government 
influence (it benefited from government largesse—renting a government 
building for almost nothing, for example), it could not publicly oppose the 
government’s policies. Leaders of Silhyangmin organizations were perplexed 
to see “reds” seize power. nevertheless, they had to cooperate with them.15
At the event, the Minister of unification explained Kim dae Jung’s 
north Korean and unification policy. He outlined the sunshine policy as an 
engagement policy (p’oyong chŏngch’aek), rather than an appeasement policy 
(yuhwa chŏngch’a). Aware of many Silhyangmins’ critique of Kim’s north 
Korean policy as a “give-in” or “red” policy, he emphasized that engagement 
was a policy of the powerful, whereas appeasement was a policy of the weak, 
and argued that in facilitating the opening and reform of north Korea, the 
sunshine policy would be more effective than a “blockade policy” supported 
by the conservatives. He also stressed that South Korea had to reconcile and 
cooperate with north Korea in the aftermath of the cold War and decades of 
national competition. He clearly described South Korea as superior to north 
Korea and as a powerful agent to bring “national prosperity” to all Koreans.
As we left the unification Building, however, Mr. Song insisted that both 
the president and the minister were “lying” about South-north relations. 
He complained that whereas previous regimes organized “anticommunist” 
events, the current government organized “procommunist” ones.
We named this the unification Building. Who could want unification more 
than Ibukodomin? We Silhyangmin are the most desperate about the national 
15 Ibukodominhoe comprises five provincial levels of civil organizations of Silhyangmin. 
After the Korean national division, Silhyangmin founded each tominhoe (provincial 
civil organization), which functioned as self-help centers and networks for 
Silhyangmin. They operated as vanguards of anticommunism under the authoritarian 
regime and currently share a government-owned building (Lee 2006).
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unification, because we have hometowns and family there. that is why we 
named this building as such. now? I am not sure what we are heading for. We 
had a clear idea about unification. unification, in terms of a liberal democratic 
system. that is what we wanted. that is why we fought so hard. We had a 
strong conviction about it. But, I am not sure what this “red” government 
wants.
Mr. Song’s statement illustrates the rigidity of his cold War thinking. Even 
though the minister emphasized that the new policy was intended to open 
and reform north Korea, Mr. Song interpreted it as “procommunist.” For him, 
the state of constant struggle against north Korea was the only condition in 
which he could feel safe. A government that did not continue that fight was 
“red” and opposed to the liberal democratic system. When anticommunism 
ceased to be the focus, as a “fighter against communism” Mr. Song became an 
anachronism and therefore felt insecure.
VII. concLuSIon
during the summer of 2000, when excitement about family reconciliations 
following the inter-Korean summit reached its peak, I returned to the office. 
Members of the Kangbyŏnhoe who were watching the reunion scenes were 
visibly uncomfortable. They were especially troubled by the public emergence 
of the Wŏlbukcha who had come from north Korea to see their families in 
the South, and by their own increasingly marginalized position.16 Mr. Hyon 
deplored what he saw as a “world in which the reds have become heroes,” and 
told me that he came to the office because he felt “suffocated” while watching 
the reunion scenes on television. Mr. Song also criticized the Wŏlbukcha 
by saying, “There is no reconciliation as far as ‘Kim Il Sung’ and ‘Kim Jong 
Il’ attached to their mouths.” He was agitated by the Wŏlbukcha’s repeated 
mentions of their gratitude to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, who, according 
to the Wŏlbukcha’s understanding, took care of them and made the reunions 
16 Wŏlbukcha are people who went north between Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945 
and the end of the Korean War in 1953. They are considered “communists” in South 
Korea. For more information on the Wŏlbukcha, see Lee (2006). 
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possible. For many members of the Kangbyŏnhoe, the war was not over. They 
regarded the state of war between the two Koreas as a normal condition—and 
the only guarantee of their safety.
At the same time, in the historical circumstance of national reconciliation 
and reunions of separated families, members of the Kangbyŏnhoe retreated 
from their “heroic memory.” While recognizing massive civilian deaths 
during the Kangbyŏn Incident, some of the Kangbyŏnhoe people lamented 
that “it was such an inhuman incident. Everybody was crazy.” Another 
member rejected his own agency by saying that “we danced to our seniors’ 
tune” (that is, they were just following orders).
the tearful excitement of the reunions also stirred up mixed emotions 
about “family.” Some members of the Kangbyŏnhoe who had assumed that 
their relative had died expressed their longings for them. Mr. Song had once 
told me, “My mom must have died of old age. But two sisters may still be 
alive. But I am not able to apply for the family reunion. What if they are 
harmed due to my contact?” As the reunion he had firmly believed impossible 
seemed possible, he regretted past actions that might have made his own 
family reunification impossible, sadly adding that “the unification will be 
accomplished after all of us die.” He seemed to accept that he was not free of 
his self-image as an anticommunist. His story and others like it reveal that the 
Kangbyŏnhoe people, who seemed to have a strong identity as anticommunist 
fighters, were in fact subjects of trauma and conflicted subjects. These stories 
also show how conflicts that had been anchored within the discourses of 
anticommunism amplified at the moment of “historical fissure.”
I have introduced politics of memory in relation to the Kangbyŏn Incident 
and Mr. Song’s story to show how interactions between South Korea’s 
glorification of anticommunist activities and memories of the war and north 
Korea’s binary and militant interpretation of a single incident during the 
Korean War had formed the identity of a group called the Kangbyŏnhoe. I 
have also examined how these memories have become sources of trauma in 
the post-cold War era. Members of the Kangbyŏnhoe have constructed their 
collective identity based on their memories as victors of a traumatic incident.
In this process, though his life narratives do not conform to the dominant 
narratives of the Kangbyŏnhoe, Mr. Song employed the collective identity as 
anticommunist fighters and acted accordingly. His story is a good example 
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of the “socially constitutive function of collective memory” observed by 
Maurice Halbwachs (1980) and others, as well as its material basis and effects. 
Mr. Song’s selective memory construction of an anticommunist fighter was 
facilitated under the anticommunist South Korean regimes and strengthened 
those regimes. But as the regime changed, so did its main narratives, and in 
this context Mr. Song’s memory, which had been a source of pride in the state 
of emergency, became a source of extreme insecurity. His resistance to this 
changing world illustrates the difficulty of transforming an identity based on 
the memory framed by a particular interpretation of the Korean War, even as 
division politics were seemingly on the wane.
In the long history of the Korean division, my observations of these 
phenomena took place during a relatively short and exceptional historical 
interlude of national reconciliation. This extraordinary situation in which old 
grammar seemed to be faltering enabled me to examine issues of memory 
and identity of the Kangbyŏnhoe people who are both agents and victims 
of national division. they are members of separated families who want 
the division system to end, as well as agents who have participated in the 
perpetuation of that system. This analysis of memory and identity formation 
based on the “us versus them” mentality that has prevailed since the division 
aids the understanding of why both Koreas constantly revive memories of 
the war and amplify the sense of crisis at this historical moment in which an 
international cold War system holds sway.17
As the inter-Korean relationship grows antagonistic again and division 
politics experiences a revival, follow-up research is necessary to examine 
changes of memory and identity of Kangbyŏnhoe members. It is also time to 
seek a new “politics of memory” that enables Koreans to develop new ethics 
based on healing, self-reflection, and reconciliation rather than reproduce 
conflicting subjects who are insecure and angry by remembering the war 
“through the war.”
17 cold War-era antagonisms waned during the period of my fieldwork, but when I 
originally published this article in 2011 they were in a period of resurgence; renewed 
tensions between the two Koreas persist in late 2013 as this article is being prepared 
for republication.
 The Korean War and the Politics of Memory 125
rEFErEncES
Books and Articles in Korean
chŏng, chin Sŏng and Yi Jae Wŏn. 2009. Memory and War: Between Glorification 
and Commemoration. Seoul: Hyumŏnist (『기억과 전쟁: 미화와 추모 사이에
서』).
Han, Kŏn Su. 2002. “competing Histories: Social Memory and Politics of 
difference.” Korean Cultural Anthropology 35 (2): 65-97 (“경합하는 역사: 사
회적 기억과 차이의 정치학,” 『한국문화인류학』 35 (2): 65-97).
Hirsh, Herbert. 2009. Genocide and the Politics of Memory: Studying Death to 
Preserve Life. trans. Kang, Song Hyon. Seoul: ch’aeksesang (『제노사이드와 
기억의 정치: 삶을 위한 죽음의 연구』).
Kim, tong ch’un. 2000. War and Society: What Was the Korean War to Us? Seoul: 
tolbegae (『전쟁과 사회: 우리에게 한국전쟁은 무엇이었나?』).
Kim, chin Sŏng. 2009. “return of trauma.” In Memory and War: Between 
Glorification and Commemoration. Seoul: Hyumŏnist (“트라우마의 귀환.” 『기
억과 전쟁: 미화와 추모 사이에서』).
Kim, Ki chin. 2002. Unfinished War, Podo League Massacre .  Seoul: 
Yŏksabip’yŏngsa (『끝나지 않은 전쟁, 국민보도연맹』).
Kim, Kwi ok. 2006. “Local Experience of the Korean War and changes of Local 
Society.” Economy and Society 71: 40-71 (“지역의 한국전쟁 경험과 지역 사회
의 변화.” 『경제와 사회』 71: 40-71).
Kim Sŏng nae. 1999. “Modernity and Violence: Politics of discourse on the 
cheju April Third Massacre of 1948” In Research on the Cheju April Third 
Massacre of 1948, ed. the Institute for Korean Historical Studies. Seoul: 
Yŏksabip’yŏngsa (“근대성과 폭력: 제주 4·3의 담론정치.” 『제주 4·3 연구』). 
   . 2001. “Sexual Politics of State Violence: on the cheju April third 
Massacre of 1948.” In Traces: Race Panic and Memory of Migration, ed. 
Meagan Morris and Brette de Bary. Seoul: Munhwagwahaksa (“국가폭력의 
성정치학 - 제주 4·3 사건을 중심으로.” 『흔적: 인종공포와 이주의 기억』).
Kim, Yŏng Pŏm. 1998. “Socio-historical Aspect and dynamics of collective 
Memory.” In Theory and Practice of Social History. Seoul: The Academy of 
Korean Studies (“집합기억의 사회사적 지평과 동학.” 『사회사 연구의 이론과 실
제』). 
Kwŏn Kwi Suk. 2006. Politics of Memory: Memories of Massacre and Historical 
Truth. Seoul: Munhak kwa chisŏngsa (『기억의 정치: 대량학살의 기억과 역사
126 Korean Social Sciences review | Vol. 3, no. 2, 2013
적 진실』).
Lee, Soo-Jung. 2010. “Fantasies of State, Bonds of Family: Wŏlbukcha Family 
Stories.” Comparative Cultural Studies 16 (1): 163-193 (“국가 판타지와 
가족의 굴레: 월북자 가족의 남한 국민되기.” 『비교문화연구』 16 (1): 163-
193).
   . 2011. “the Korean War and the Politics of Memory: the ‘Kangbyŏn 
Incident.’” Korean Cultural Anthropology 44 (1): 85-118 (“6·25 전쟁과 기억
의 정치: ‘강변사건’을 중심으로.” 『한국문화인류학』 44 (1): 85-118). 
Pak, ch’an Sŭng. 2000. “the Korean War and tragedy of Sedŭng-ri, a Vlan 
Village of chindo.” History and Reality 38: 274-308 (“한국전쟁과 진도 동족
마을 세등리의 비극.” 『역사와 현실』 38: 274-308).
   . 2010. The Korean War that Went to a Village: Small Wars that Occurred 
in Villages During the Korean War. Seoul: tolbegae (『마을로 간 한국전쟁: 한
국전쟁기 마을에서 벌어진 작은 전쟁들』).
P’yo, In chu. 2003. War and People. Seoul: Hanul Academy (『전쟁과 사람들』).
research Institute of History at the Academy of Social Sciences. 1988. Korean 
History. Pyongyang: owŏl (『조선통사』).
the Institute for Korean Historical Studies, ed. 1999. Research on Cheju April 
Third Massacre. Seoul: Yŏksabip’yŏngsa (『제주 4·3연구』).
the national committee for Investigating the truth about civilian Massacre 
during the Korean War. 2005. White Paper on Civilian Massacre During 
the Korean War. Seoul: Hanul (『한국전쟁전후민간인학살실태보고서』).
Yi, Yong Ki. 2001. “Experiences of the Korean War in a Village and Its Memory: 
A case of ‘Moskŭba’ Village in Kyŏnggi-do” Critical Studies on Modern 
Korean History 6: 11-55 (“마을에서의 한국전쟁 경험과 그 기억: 경기도의 한 ‘모
스크바’ 마을 사례를 중심으로.” 『역사문제연구』 6: 11-55.)
Yun, taek rim. 1997. “oral History and representation of Historical Experience 
of Local People: Focusing on testimonies of Pak Hyŏng Ho at Siyang-ri, 
Yesan, chungnam.” Korean Cultural Anthropology 30 (2): 187-213 (“구술사
와 지방민의 역사적 경험 재현: 충남 예산 시양리의 박형호씨 구술 증언을 중심으
로.” 『한국문화인류학』 30 (2): 187-213).
Yu, Im Ha. 2007. “Fables of Identity: collecting Anticommunist testimonies and 
Making Memories of cold War.” Korean National Language and Literature 
39 (12): 275-308 (“정체성의 우화: 반공 증언수집과 냉전의 기억 만들기.” 『겨레어
문학』 39 (12): 275-308).
 The Korean War and the Politics of Memory 127
Books and Articles in English
Alonso, Ana Maria. 1988. “The Effects of truth: re-Presentations of the Past and 
the Imagining of community.” Journal of Historical Sociology 1 (1): 33-57.
Aretxaga, Begoña. 1997. Shattering Silence: Women, Nationalism, and Political 
Subjectivity in Northern Ireland. Princeton, nJ: Princeton university Press.
chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. 1990. The History and Sociology of Genocide: 
Analyses and Case Studies. new Haven and London: Yale university Press.
cho, Hee-yeon. 2000. “The Structure of the South Korean developmental regime 
and Its transformation: Statist Mobilization and Authoritarian Integration 
in the Anticommunist regimentation.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 1 (3): 
408-426.
das, Veena. 1995. Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary 
India, delhi. India: oxford university Press.
Edkins, Jenny. 2003. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. cambridge, England: 
cambridge university Press.
Haaken, Janice. 2002. “cultural Amnesia: Memory, trauma, and War.” Signs 28 
(1): 455-457.
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1980. The Collective Memory. new York: Harper & row.
Humprey, Michael. 2000. “From terror to trauma: commissioning truth for 
national reconciliation.” Social Identities 6 (1): 7-27.
Lee, Soo-Jung. 2006. Making and Unmaking the Korean National Division: 
Separated Families in the Cold War and Post Cold-War Eras. Ph.d. diss. 
university of Illinois at urbana-champaign.
radstone, Susannah. 2002. “the War of the Fathers: trauma, Fantasy, and 
September 11.” Signs 28 (1): 457-459.
Wise, Amanda. 2004. “Embodying Exile: trauma and collective Identities among 
East timorese refugees in Australia.” Social Analysis 48 (3): 24-39.
Newspaper
Korea Herald, 18 June, 1998.

